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When Ferae Naturae Attack: Public Policy Implications and 
Concerns for the Public and State regarding the Classification 
of Indigenous Wildlife as Interpreted Under State Immunity 
Statutes 
 
L. Reagan Florence1 
“All meanings, we know, depend on the key of 
interpretation” 
—George Eliot 2 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On a family campout an 11-year-old boy is stolen, still in his 
sleeping bag—dragged in the middle of the night from his tent by a 
wild black bear—the boy is mauled to death.3 This gruesome and 
tragic incident sparked a recent perplexing court decision that has 
unhinged the very notion of municipal and governmental liability 
under respective immunity statute.4 The decision proved that there 
are contrasting opinions and public policy concerns on whether a 
state government can be held liable for a black bear dismembering a 
small boy, and on whether a black bear should fall under a State’s 
                                                
1 The author would like to sincerely thank the Hamline Journal of Public Law 
and Policy and its members for their support and assistance in the production of 
this article; the author further thanks her family for their love and support—
especially Gerald B. Robinson Jr. for his life-long influence, and his contagious 
passion for life, knowledge, law, and nature; and most importantly, this article 
respectfully remembers the life of Samuel Ives—whose tragic story and case 
gave rise to the idea for this article. 
2 GEORGE ELLIOT, DANIEL DERONDA (1876). 
3 Israelsen, see infra text accompanying note 9. 
4 See generally Francis v. State, Utah Div. of Wildlife Res., No. 20111027, 2013 
UT 65 (Utah 2013). 
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waiver of immunity exceptions as a “natural condition” on the 
land.5 
State Immunity Acts generally preclude suits against the 
State in certain narrow situations by providing exceptions for States 
in regard to municipal tort liability.6 Under these statutes the state 
can assert immunity with respect to the recreational use of property, 
or with respect to conditions on particular unimproved properties.7 
For example, under many municipal immunity statutes there is an 
exception of a “natural condition” on the land, which holds the 
State immune to suit if an individual is injured as a result of such 
condition.8 This article examines the state of Utah’s Immunity Act 
(and exceptions), and the policy implications facing the public and 
State stemming from the statutory interpretation by the Utah 
Supreme Court in the recent case, Francis v. State (Francis). 
The purpose of this article is to show that the Utah Supreme 
Court came to the wrong decision in Francis, by excluding a black 
bear from the “natural condition” exception under Utah’s Immunity 
Act, and thereby opening the State to liability. Further this article 
will show that indigenous wildlife is a condition of the natural land. 
And for strong public policy reasons, Immunity Acts should be 
broadly interpreted to include indigenous wildlife within the 
                                                
5 Id. 
6 Lawrence Rosenthal, A Theory of Governmental Damages Liability: Torts, 
Constitutional Torts, and Takings, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 797, 804-05 (2007) 
(Only the State of Washington has enacted particular legislation that holds 
governmental defendants liable under tort law similarly to private situations and 
private tortfeasors, while all other states have statutory measures of limiting such 
liability under tort law). 
7 63 C.J.S. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 1051 (West). 
8 Rosenthal, supra note 6, at 808, (stating that jurisdictions typically treat these 
specific particular immunity sections under either the condition of 
property/facilities used for recreational purposes, or that of unimproved public 
property); see also Rosenthal at 805-809 (discussing other types of general state 
immunity statutes that include: immunity for injuries caused by reliance on 
statutes or other enactments; specified intentional torts of public employees; 
immunity from particular punitive damages; immunity for the failure to provide 
adequate police service or protection; a failure to provide adequate firefighting or 
other emergency services, and medical care, etc). 
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“natural condition” exception, and alternatively should be drafted to 
expressly include indigenous wildlife within these exceptions. 
First, Section II of this article introduces the tragic 2007 
incident of young boy, Samuel Ives, who was tragically mauled, 
and killed by a black bear in a Utah campground. Litigation from 
the tragic incident against both the United States and the State of 
Utah is then introduced, and a history for the Utah case is presented 
in Section III. Section IV demonstrates the main issue of the article 
and specifically examines the recent controversial decision by the 
Utah Supreme Court in the case against the State of Utah, Francis 
v. State (Francis)—where the court excluded a black bear as a 
“natural condition” on the land, under Utah’s Immunity Act, which 
opened State to liability. 
Section V of the article examines the befuddling reasoning 
of the Utah Supreme Court’s (majority) holding in Francis, that 
wildlife is excluded as a “natural condition” under both Utah case 
law and the Immunity Act. Then, Section VI contrastingly displays 
the paradoxical nature of the majority’s holding under both Utah 
case law and statutory interpretation, and displays the more 
appropriate reasoning behind the opinion of the Francis dissent. 
This section further displays that under proper interpretation of both 
the Immunity Act and Utah case law, indigenous wildlife is a 
“natural condition”. 
Next Section VII displays other jurisdictions and cases 
where courts have held that indigenous wildlife is a “natural 
condition”, or condition on the land under Immunity Acts. 
Following, Section VIII examines specific language of selected 
Immunity Acts under particular analysis of case law interpretations 
where wildlife was considered a “natural condition”. This section 
then offers express suggestions to Utah lawmakers to change the 
current Immunity Act, as to include wildlife under the “natural 
condition” exception. 
Section IX contemplates the policy considerations under the 
opinion of the Francis majority, and contrastingly presents the 
negative tax, public, economic, and environmental ramifications of 
the majority’s decision. Lastly, Section X concludes that the 
majority’s decision in Francis was unfounded and incorrect, and 
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that a more proper decision would have reflected that of the opinion 
of the dissent, under proper interpretation of Utah case law and the 
Immunity Act. This section also reiterates the potential negative 
public policy concerns and considerations by excluding indigenous 
wildlife as a “natural condition” under Immunity Act exceptions, 
and the decision in Francis. Further this section restates that 
Immunity Statutes should be construed broadly to include wildlife, 
but that to avoid decisions like Francis lawmakers should change 
current Immunity Acts to include wildlife as a “natural condition”. 
II. DISCUSSION OF UTAH INCIDENT 
For the state of Utah, June 2007 avowed a tragic news 
headline, “Boy killed by bear—the 11 year old was pulled from his 
tent”.9 Even more unsettling were the details that began to emerge 
hour by hour with the updated reports. The boy, Samuel Ives, was 
sleeping in a tent with his family (the Mulveys) at the State-run 
Timpooneke Campground when in the middle of the night a black 
bear dragged Ives from the tent in his sleeping bag and killed him.10 
Reports surfaced that during the incident Ives’ family could hear his 
screams of terror, but could not locate him outside of the tent; the 
family filed an abduction report after their unsuccessful searching.11 
Several hours later however, officers successfully found Ives’ 
young and lifeless body approximately 400 yards from the family’s 
tent.12 The following day the bear, which weighed approximately 
250-300 pounds, was located by the extensive tracking of five 
houndsmen, and 26 dogs.13 The black bear was captured, killed, and 
was confirmed by DNA testing to be the same bear that killed 
Ives.14 
                                                
9 Sara Israelsen, Boy killed by bear—The 11-year-old was pulled from his tent, 
DESERET NEWS (June 19, 2007, 12:35 AM), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/ 
665194896/Boy-killed-by-bear.html?pg=all. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
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It was later revealed that the same black bear that killed Ives 
had previously raided Timpooneke Campground, and had attacked 
another camper.15 At the earlier incident, the camper, with the aide 
of his friends, successfully chased off the black bear.16 The camper 
notified Utah Highway Patrol, which then notified the Utah 
Division of Wildlife Resources (DWR). DWR then went on a 
search to track and destroy the bear - the DWR’s policy when 
dealing with an aggressive ‘Level Three’ black bear.17 However, 
the search proved fruitless, and DWS did not find or capture the 
bear.18 The agents decided to return in the morning and clean the 
campsite of food, or anything that might attract the bear back to the 
site of the attack.19 
The DWR agents left the site believing that no one would 
use it, and even waved to the family of Samuel Ives (the Mulveys) 
as they passed them going in the opposite direction on the road.20 In 
fact, the DWR agents did nothing to warn anyone who might use at 
the campground of the potential danger, nor did they warn any 
potential camper of the earlier bear attack.21 Tragically, the 
Mulveys did use the campground, and unfortunately, they failed to 
properly pack away food items—including a can of soda and a 
granola bar that young Ives brought into the tent for a later snack.22 
Heartbreakingly, the same black bear that had earlier terrorized 
                                                
15 Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶ 8 (noting that the bear attack on the other camper 
occurred early in the morning of June 17, 2007, the same day that Samuel Ives 
was killed). 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at ¶ 10. See also UTAH DIVISION OF WILDLIFE RESOURCES, UTAH BLACK 
BEAR MANAGEMENT PLAN PUBLICATION NO.00-23, (June 27, 2000) [hereinafter 
BLACK BEAR MANAGEMENT PLAN] [p. 21] available at: http://wildlife.utah.gov/ 
bear/pdf/00bearplan.pdf (“Level Three bears are chronic or acute offenders that 
have caused significant property damage or are a threat to human safety. The 
prescribed solution is destruction of the bear, usually by Wildlife Services, with 
which the DWR has a Memorandum of Understanding.”). 
18 Id. at ¶ 11. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at ¶ 13. 
21 Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶ 12. 
22 Id. at ¶ 14. 
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Timpooneke Campground returned in the night, stole Ives from the 
family tent in his sleeping bag, and mauled him to death.23 
III. CASE HISTORY AND RECENT RULING 
Because of the travesty and the horrific death of their son, 
the Mulveys initiated separate legal suits against the United States 
government and the United States Forest Service, as well as the 
State of Utah and the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources, 
asserting “that state and federal officials knew about a bear 
encounter with humans and searched for the bear but failed to close 
the area until the animal could be found.”24 
The Mulveys brought suit in United States District Court in 
Francis v. United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act 
(“FTCA”).25 More specifically, under the FTCA Ives’s asserted that 
the United States Forest Service was negligent for its failure to 
warn campers of the black bear, or to close the campground after it 
knew of the bear’s presence in the area.26 In May 2011, the court 
granted judgment in favor of the Mulveys, awarding them over $1.9 
million dollars for the United States’ negligence in protecting 
Samuel Ives.27 
                                                
23 Id. at ¶ 14. 
24 Sara Israelsen-Hartley, Family sues in '07 bear incident, DESERET NEWS (Mar. 
29, 2009), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/695265672/Family-sues-in-07-
bear-incident.html?pg=all. 
25 See Francis v. U.S., No. 2:08CV244 DAK, 2011 WL 1667915, at *1 (D. Utah 
May 3, 2011). 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 7-8, (Interestingly, in the opinion, the court found that the United States 
was 65% fault for Samuel Ives’s death, that the State of Utah (through the 
Department of Wildlife Resources) was 25% at fault for failing to contact the 
Forest Service, and that the Mulveys were 10% at fault for attracting the bear 
back to the site by leaving food out in the open. The court opined that although 
no price could replace the life of young Samuel Ives that the amount of $3 
million was an appropriate award based on other awards from previous child-
related wrongful death suits. However, the Mulveys were limited to collecting $2 
million for the cap of liability from the United States government due to their 
administrative claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2675(b). Therefore because the United 
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In the second, and more monumental action, the Mulveys 
initiated suit in district court against the State of Utah and the 
Department of Wildlife Services, in Francis v. State (Francis), in 
March of 2008.28 Through the many appeals process, the 
commencement of this action would prove paramount for the 
purposes of this article, and in July 2013, would eventually lead to 
the monumental determination of whether a black bear is a “natural 
condition” on public or controlled lands.29 Similar to their 
negligence claims against the United States government in Francis 
v. UnitedStates, in Francis v. State, the Mulveys alleged negligence 
on part of the State of Utah and the Department of Wildlife Services 
(DWR) for failure to warn them about the dangerous bear in the 
area.30 
Initially, the district court dismissed the Mulveys’s claims 
under the “permit exception” of the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act.31 The Mulveys appealed the decision, and the Supreme Court 
reversed and held that the permit exception did not apply to the 
particular facts of the case.32 The State of Utah, on remand, asserted 
two alternative arguments: that it owed no duty to the Mulveys, and 
even if it did, any liability was precluded under the “natural 
condition” exception to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act—to 
which the district court dismissed the case for a second time.33 
                                                
States was 65% at fault, the Mulveys were awarded 65% of the $3 million 
damages calculation, which equaled $1,950,000). 
28 See generally Francis v. State, Utah Div. of Wildlife Res., 2010 UT 62, 248 
P.3d 44. 
29 Id. 
30 Francis v. State, 2013 UT 65, ¶ 1; see also Francis v. U.S., No. 2:08CV244 
DAK, 2011 WL 1667915, at *1 (D. Utah May 3, 2011) (where the Mulveys 
asserted claims of negligence against the United States Forest Service under the 
Federal Torts Claims Act). 
31 Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶ 1; see Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301 (5)(k) (West) 
(where the “permit exception” provides that the immunity for a governmental 
entity is not waived if the injury arises from “the issuance, denial, suspension, or 
revocation of, or by the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke, any 
permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization.”). 
32 Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶ 1. 
33 Id. at ¶ 2; see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-7-301 (5)(k) (West 2013). 
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After the second dismissal, the Mulveys appealed and raised 
three arguments: that under case law doctrine the State of Utah was 
disallowed from presenting its alternative arguments on remand 
because the alternative arguments had not originally been raised on 
the record; that the State owed the Mulveys a duty of care; and 
lastly that the “natural condition” exception of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act was inapplicable to the State’s 
defense.34 The State responded that it was not disallowed from 
presenting the alternative arguments on remand; that it owed no 
duty to the Mulveys because no “special relationship” had been 
created; and that it was precluded from liability because the black 
bear that attacked Samuel Ives was “natural condition” on the land 
under the Immunity Act’s exception.35 
Based on these arguments, in July 2013, the Supreme Court 
of Utah reversed the district court’s previous grant of summary 
judgment for the State.36 The court held that the State was not 
barred in presenting its alternative arguments on remand; that the 
State created a “special relationship” with the Mulveys37; and that a 
bear was not considered a “natural condition” under the Immunity 
Act, and therefore the State of Utah was not immune from 
liability.38 Based on these holdings, the Utah Supreme Court 
reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings that are to 
be construed consistent with this most recent opinion.39 
                                                
34 Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶ 2. 
35 Id. at ¶ 3. 
36 Id. at ¶ 4. 
37 Id. at ¶ 34 (where the Supreme Court held that the State had created a “special 
relationship” with the Mulveys because it took specific action to protect them as 
the next group to use the campsite. After the initial attack on Mr. Francom [the 
man who was attacked earlier the day of Ives’s death at the same campground] 
DWR agents swept the campsite to make sure no one was there and that there 
was nothing that would attract the bear back to the location. Because of this, the 
court stated that the State knew of “a specific threat to a distinct group and took 
specific action to protect that group”, and thereby created a “special relationship” 
with anyone that would occupy the campsite, including the Mulveys). 
38 Id. at ¶ 4. 
39 Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶ 49 (it should be noted that as this article went to print, 
the case had been recently remanded, therefore there was no information 
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IV. UTAH’S STATE IMMUNITY ACT AND THE 
“NATURAL CONDITION” EXCEPTION 
In Francis v. State (Francis), the crux of the State of Utah’s 
liability hung on the issue of whether the black bear that killed Ives 
was considered a “natural condition” on the land under Utah’s 
Immunity Act, specifically section § 63G-7-301 (5)(k).40 The 
interpretation and classification of the bear was crucial because if it 
was considered a “natural condition” on the land, under the 
operation of the Immunity Act, the State would have been 
precluded from liability in Francis.41 
Specifically, the Immunity Act states that Utah as a 
governmental entity, does not waive immunity from suit if specific 
injury arises, results, or is in connection with “any natural condition 
on publicly owned or controlled lands.”42 However, the text of the 
Immunity Act itself lacks clarification or direction as to what 
constitutes or defines a “natural condition” on publicly owned or 
controlled lands.43 The purpose of the “natural condition” exception 
in Utah is to necessarily protect the State from liability arising on 
Utah’s vast wild landscapes; it is unreasonable to expect the 
government to protect every member of the public from every 
potentially hazardous encounter on such terrain.44 
In Francis, the State claimed that section 301(5)(k) of the 
Immunity Act precluded any liability against the State, because 
under interpretation of the statute, the black bear that killed Ives 
was circumscribed as a “natural condition”.45 The court applied a 
three-part-test, in order to determine whether the State of Utah had 
immunity under Utah’s Immunity Act: (1) whether activity was 
undertaken, which activity sanctioned as a governmental function; 
                                                
available at the time of publication as to the final disposition of the case—
including any award of damages). 
40 Id. at ¶ 39; see generally UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-7-301 (5)(k) (West 2013). 
41 Id. at ¶ 40; see generally UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-7-301 (West 2013). 
42 UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-7-301(5)(k) (West 2013) (emphasis added). 
43 Id. 
44 See Grappendorf v. Pleasant Grove City, 2007 UT 84, ¶ 8. 
45 Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶¶ 16-17. 
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(2) whether the government waived immunity for the particular 
sanctioned governmental activity; and (3) whether there was an 
exception to the waiver of immunity for the activity sanctioned as a 
government function.46 
In Francis, the only disputed part of the test was whether the 
“natural condition” exception was applicable as an exception to the 
State of Utah’s waiver of immunity.47 The court determined that the 
“natural condition” exception was not applicable in the State’s case 
as an exception to waiver of immunity, because the black bear that 
killed Ives was not a “natural condition” on publicly owned or 
controlled lands under section 301(5)(k) of the Immunity Act.48 
The Utah Supreme Court’s puzzling interpretation that the 
black bear that killed Ives was not a “natural condition” on the land 
ultimately lost the State its case, and precluded the State from 
asserting governmental immunity under Utah’s Immunity Act.49 
Further, the interpretation of the Immunity Act under Francis, 
raises serious public policy stretching over public, municipal, 
safety, environmental, and economic concerns.50 
V.THE MAJORITY’S “NATURAL CONDITION” 
To fully understand the importance of the determination that 
the black bear that killed Ives did not fall under the “natural 
condition” exception in Francis, it is imperative to look first at how 
the court came to its conclusion, which ultimately opened the State 
to liability. This began with the court’s construction of statutory 
interpretation generally, and then specifically of the narrow 
interpretation of the Immunity Act’s “natural condition” exception. 
The court in Francis stated that the determination of 
whether any condition on the land is a “natural condition” is a 
matter of statutory interpretation, and that the objective is to first 
                                                
46 Id. at ¶ 39 (citing Blackner v. State, Dept. of Transp., 2002 UT 44, ¶ 10, 48 
P.3d 949 (Utah 2002)). 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 See generally Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶ 49. 
50 See generally infra Section IX. 
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look to the evidentiary intent and purpose of the legislature—
illustrated by the “plain meaning” of the text.51 Next, the court 
stated that to define the “plain meaning” of the text, the court 
should look to the “lay meaning” or usual (daily) meaning of the 
text.52 To state otherwise, to comprehend legislative intent behind 
the text of the statute, the court should look to the plain meaning. In 
order to find the plain meaning of the text, the court should look to 
an everyday or “ordinary” understanding of the text. 
Specifically the court in Francis, construed the ordinary 
meaning of the terminology “natural condition on the land”, citing 
its own view as support for the definition of the term’s ‘ordinary 
meaning’.53 The court used this interpretation scheme to determine 
that, in its view, “condition on the land” meant features tied into the 
land solely, such as rivers, trees, and lakes, and that because bears 
are naturally transitory they don’t fit this ‘ordinary meaning’.54 The 
court further determined that, in its view, “one would not ordinarily 
refer to a bear, or wildlife generally, as a ‘condition on the land’”.55 
The court thus limited the “natural condition” exception to solely 
topographical features or conditions.56 The majority did so based on 
its own opinion on the ordinary meaning, with no reference to any 
other outside resources, other than its own past opinions where only 
topographical structures were considered “natural conditions”.57 
Aside from its own opinion that a bear was not considered a 
“natural condition” under an ordinary meaning, the court further 
relied on another Utah Supreme Court case, Grappendorf v. 
Pleasant Grove City, with a similar holding.58 Grappendorf 
involved the parents of a young, deceased boy, suing the city in a 
wrongful death action after a major gust of wind picked up and 
                                                
51 Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶ 41 (citing Grappendorf, 2007 UT 84, ¶ 9). 
52 Id. (citing O'Dea v. Olea, 2009 UT 46, ¶ 32, 217 P.3d 704). 
53 Id. at ¶¶ 41-42 (emphasis added). 
54 Id. (emphasis added). 
55 Id. (emphasis added) (the court extends the black bear to other forms of 
“indigenous wildlife” in Utah for purposes of statutory interpretation). 
56 Id. at ¶ 42-46. 
57 See Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶¶ 42-48. 
58 Id. at ¶ 43-46. 
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threw a moveable pitching mound at the boy and killed him.59 The 
city asserted the “natural condition” exception to waiver of 
immunity under the Immunity Act, stating that a gust of wind that 
picked up the pitching mound was a “natural condition”.60 
However, the city was unsuccessful in their claim of immunity 
under the Immunity Act’s “natural condition” exception, as the gust 
of wind was not considered a “natural condition” on the land.61 
Similar to Francis, the court in Grappendorf encountered 
the task of deciphering the meaning of a “natural condition” under 
Utah’s Immunity Act.62 The majority considered the plain language 
of the statute when determining applicability of the “natural 
condition” exception.63 The court used the Webster’s Dictionary 
and determined that the word “natural” was limited to something 
produced or present in nature, and was then modified by the word 
“condition”, which meant, a state of being or mode.64 It then stated 
that the language “on publicly owned or controlled lands” limited 
the terminology of “natural condition”, indicated a position on the 
land “topographical in nature, not merely atmospheric”.65 The court 
determined that the language of the statute required some physical 
contact, supported by the surface, or a part of the land in order to be 
a “natural condition” and that a gust of wind did not fall under the 
exception of the Immunity Act.66 
In Francis, the court gleaned seemingly additional support 
that a “natural condition” is exclusively topographical in two other 
Utah Supreme Court decisions, Stuckman ex rel. Nelson v. Salt 
Lake City and Blackner v. Department of Transportation.67 The 
                                                
59 Grappendorf, 2007 UT 84, ¶ 2. 
60 Id. at ¶ 3. 
61 Id. at ¶ 15 
62 Id. at ¶ 10. 
63 Id. 
64 Grappendorf, 2007 UT 84 (citing WEBSTER'S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY, 
729 (1995)). 
65 Id. at ¶ 10. 
66 Id. at ¶¶ 10-15; (specifically the court stated, “[a]tmospheric conditions, like 
the gust of wind that allegedly led to [the boy’s] fatal injuries, do not constitute 
natural conditions on the land”). 
67 Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶ 44. 
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court in Stuckman determined that a river was a “natural condition” 
on the land.68 And avalanches (and the originating snow-packs) 
were determined to be conditions on the land, in Blackner.69 
Lastly, in Francis, the court naively reasoned that if the 
legislature intended to include indigenous wildlife as part of the 
Immunity Act’s “natural condition” exception, then it would have 
specifically stated so.70 The court stated that when a statute leaves 
the possibility for narrow exceptions open for interpretation, any 
uncertainties should be resolved in way of the general provision 
instead of the exceptions to the provision.71 
 
 
 
 
 
VI. THE DISSENT’S “NATURAL CONDITION”–THE 
APPROPRIATE INTERPRETATION UNDER PROPER 
UTAH IMMUNITY ACT AND UTAH CASE LAW 
ANALYSIS 
The Utah Supreme Court’s reasoning behind the 
interpretation that indigenous wildlife (specifically the black bear) 
was not a “natural condition” is nothing but befuddling, and lacks 
evidentiary support under proper interpretation of case law under 
application of the Immunity Act.  Because of this, Francis was not 
a unanimous decision—as two justices appropriately wrote a 
dissenting opinion.72 In the dissent’s opinion, the State was immune 
                                                
68 Id. (citing Nelson By and Through Stuckman v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568, 
574-75 (Utah 1996)). 
69 Id. (citing Blackner, 2002 UT 44, ¶ 16). 
70 Id. at ¶¶ 45-46. 
71 Id. at ¶ 47 (citing Nini v. Mercer Cnty. Cmty. Coll., 995 A.2d 1094, 1100 
(N.J. 2010)). 
72 Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶ 50 (Parrish, J., dissenting) (dissenting opinion was 
filed by Justice Parrish, in which Justice Lee joined). 
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because the presence of the black bear as indigenous wildlife 
constituted a “natural condition on publicly owned or controlled 
lands”.73 The dissent appropriately scrutinizes the majority’s 
opinion, and illustrates that the holding should have affirmed that 
indigenous wildlife constitutes a “natural condition” under a more 
broad interpretation of the Immunity Act and prior case law.74 
Because of these distinctions, the State should have been immune 
from liability.75 
A. Indigenous wildlife as a “natural condition” under 
proper analysis of the ‘ordinary meaning’ under Utah’s 
Immunity Act 
The dissent stated that, although the majority used a proper 
statutory analysis scheme to interpret the Immunity Act, it did not 
come to the proper outcome in determining that indigenous wildlife 
was not a “natural condition” on the land, as the “textual analysis 
suggest[ed] the contrary conclusion”.76 The dissent criticized the 
majority for “lack[ing] both explanation and textual analysis” for its 
why, under the ordinary meaning, wildlife would not constitute a 
“natural condition.”77 
Contrary to the majority’s unfounded opinion, under the 
plain language of the statute, the ordinary opinion of the “natural 
condition” of Utah’s vast landscapes would undoubtedly include 
wildlife as an essential component of the natural topography.78 
Utah’s lands and wildlife, under the plain meaning and ordinary 
opinion, are, and always have been intricately intertwined—fused 
by nature.79 As the dissent eloquently states: 
[l]ong before the borders of Utah were drawn, the 
land, in its natural condition, contained large and 
                                                
73 Id. at ¶¶ 50-62. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at ¶ 51 (emphasis added). 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at ¶¶53-54. 
79 Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶ 54 (Parrish, J., dissenting). 
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small indigenous wildlife in addition to its 
topographical features. And today, conservation 
efforts aimed at preserving the natural condition of 
Utah’s public lands include support for and 
rehabilitation of native species. To read “natural 
condition” in the limited context of topographical 
features ignores an entire segment of the unique 
natural condition of Utah’s public lands.80 
Further providing evidence of the lay opinion, the dissent 
remarks that when drawing a comparison of the naturally existing 
conditions between Utah and other states, one would irrefutably 
describe the abundant and diverse wildlife that habituates Utah’s 
lands.81 Additionally, this diverse wildlife is a component for 
drawing in tourists, who visit particular areas of Utah’s landscapes 
specifically to enjoy the diverse indigenous wildlife.82 This cogent 
reasoning demonstrates that the majority was mistaken in its 
analysis, and that under the ordinary ‘lay’ meaning, the meaning of 
“natural condition” encompasses indigenous wildlife. 
The majority’s narrow interpretation of the Immunity Act 
goes against the very purpose of the Act, which was passed to 
protect the State from particular liabilities, as it cannot be 
reasonably expected to protect the public from every condition on 
government owned natural lands.83 The dissent displays the 
majority’s bewildering reasoning that if the legislature meant to 
include wildlife within the statute it would have, as the court had 
previously taken no issue with broadly construing the exception to 
include to rivers, avalanches, and cliffs, even when the Act itself 
                                                
80 Id. 
81 Id. at ¶ 55 (specifically the dissent states that, “[a] component of the natural 
condition of the land in Utah is the presence of deer, elk, moose, and black 
bears”). 
82 Id. (the dissent further draws a comparison between Utah and Yellowstone 
National Park, as tourists are drawn to both Yellowstone and Utah for both the 
topography as well as the wildlife). 
83 See Grappendorf, 2007 UT 84, ¶ 8. 
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does not expressly define such applicability.84 Therefore, the very 
purpose of the Immunity Act has been and can be reasonably be 
inferred to intend for a broad interpretation, in order for municipal 
liability protection, and the majority should have construed the 
Immunity Act broadly to effectuate this intent. 
Lastly, and most interestingly, the majority perplexingly 
admitted that wildlife could fall under this exception, stating, “we 
readily acknowledge that wildlife could plausibly fall within the 
scope of the natural condition exception”.85 With this admission the 
majority displays that it is conceivable that the lay opinion could 
reasonably include wildlife within the “natural condition” 
exception.86 Therefore, its determination that the black bear did not 
fall under the “natural condition” exception is capricious and 
unfounded. 
 B. Indigenous wildlife as a “natural condition” under 
proper analysis of Utah case law 
The dissent further indicates that the majority improperly 
interpreted and placed undue reliance on the foundation of the 
Grappendorf case.87 A closer look at the actual reading of the 
Grappendorf case reveals a much different result than the 
majority’s conclusion.88 The Grappendorf case stated that “natural” 
means to be “[p]resent in or produced by nature”, and is a modifier 
to the word “condition” which means “[a][m]ode or state of 
                                                
84 See Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶ 60 (Parrish, J., dissenting); see also UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 63G-7-301 (5)(k) (West). 
85 Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶ 45 (emphasis added). 
86 See 2013 UT 65 at ¶ 60 (Parrish, J., dissenting). 
87 Id. at ¶¶ 56-57. 
88 Id., see Grappendorf, 2007 UT 84, at ¶ 15. Interestingly, it should be noted 
that Justice Parrish wrote the Utah Supreme Court’s decision in Grappendorf, 
which held that an atmospheric condition on the land was not a “natural 
condition” on the land, and also wrote the dissenting opinion in Francis, where 
he disagrees that only topographical features constitute a “natural condition” on 
the land. 
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being.”89 The prepositional phrase “on publicly owned or controlled 
lands” limits the terminology of “natural condition”.90 Then in 
looking to the contextual usage of “on” would be “[u]sed to indicate 
. . . [a] [p]osition above and in contact with” or “[c]ontact with a 
surface, regardless of position.”91 
Subsequently, under a more careful reading of Grappendorf, 
a “natural condition” requires contact with the land, as it refers to a 
state of being or a mode present or produced by nature, which, as 
the dissent remarked, would include the black bear that attacked 
Ives as indigenous wildlife.92 As the dissent stated: 
[w]hile I would agree that one does not normally 
refer to a particular animal as a ‘natural condition on 
the land,’ the presence of indigenous wildlife 
generally is as much a part of the natural condition 
of land as are the rivers, lakes, or trees cited by the 
majority.93 
Further of issue is the majority’s interpretation that, under 
Grappendorf, natural conditions must be only topographical.94 A 
careful reading illustrates that the case did not exclusively limit 
topographical conditions as “natural conditions” but rather held that 
such features “can” constitute “natural conditions” as they are on 
the land.95 The requirement merely states that a “natural condition” 
needs to have its existence or physical contact on or with the land, 
or be a part of the land.96 The purpose of the Grappendorf decision 
was to exclude atmospheric conditions, like wind, from being 
considered “natural conditions”, not to hold that topographical 
conditions exclusively constitute such.97 
                                                
89 Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶ 52 (citing Grappendorf, 2007 UT 84, ¶ 10 (citing 
WEBSTER'S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 729 (1995))). 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at ¶ 53. 
93 Id. 
94 Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶ 56 (Parrish, J., dissenting). 
95 Id. at ¶¶ 56-57 (citing Grappendorf, 2007 UT 84, ¶ 10) (emphasis added). 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
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While the majority is correct that wildlife is not 
topographical, it completely fails to recognize that wildlife is a part 
of the land. It is erroneous to say that wildlife is not tangibly and 
organically connected to the land, simply because it is transitory.98 
There is a deep-rooted connection between wildlife and the land, 
which forms a complete ecological cycle of nature. Wildlife is 
created and is born on the land, it dies on the land, and its remains 
become a part of the land. Contrary to the majority’s opinion, 
wildlife is a part of the land, it is supported by the land’s surface, 
and it is completely reliant ecologically for sustainment and its 
natural habitat on the land.99 Because of this indissoluble 
connection between wildlife and the land, the contextual analysis 
requirements in Grappendorf; under the application of the 
Immunity Act’s “natural condition” exception, was satisfied in 
Francis.100 
Another point of contention is the second case that the 
majority cited as support, Blackner v. Department of 
Transportation, where avalanches were considered a “natural 
condition” under the Immunity Act exception.101 The Francis 
dissent correctly pointed out that the majority’s holding in Francis 
is directly and paradoxically in contrast with its previous holding in 
Blackner, because an avalanche is not topographical itself, but only 
originates and travels down or on top of features that are 
topographical.102 The dissent in Francis stated: 
[w]hile the path of an avalanche may be traced on a 
map, its limited existence means that such efforts 
will not endure when the weather or the season 
changes. In this way, an avalanche shares little with 
                                                
98 See Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶ 42 (where majority states that in its opinion the 
“ordinary meaning” of a “condition on the land” is tied with features that have a 
much closer tie to the land, like lakes, rivers, trees, and topographical structures. 
The majority states that because a bear is “transitory in nature” it is not directly a 
part of the land). 
99 Id. at ¶ 57 (Parrish, J., dissenting). 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at ¶ 58. 
102 Id. 
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enduring topographical features such as rivers or 
cliffs, but is more akin to indigenous wildlife.103 
The above distinction evidences that even a temporary, 
seasonal, and arguably transitory product of weather, has been 
considered a “condition on the land” for the purpose of the natural 
condition” exception.104  Consequently, under the court’s very own 
previous reasoning and holding, a “natural condition” on the land 
need not be solely topographical, and can possess some cog of 
natural transition to fit under the distinction.105 Where the court had 
previously held that such a temporary and transitory condition on 
the land, such as an avalanche, is a “natural condition” then, “native 
species that have been supported for hundreds, if not thousands, of 
years ‘on’ the land must also fall within the ambit of the natural 
condition exception”.106 The majority’s own reasoning suggests that 
indigenous wildlife should qualify under the description of a 
“natural condition” on the land. To hold otherwise is paradoxical, 
and goes against the court’s very own previous holdings.107 
Therefore, under both the proper broad interpretation of the 
Act’s ordinary meaning, and Utah case law, indigenous wildlife is a 
“natural condition” on the land, and should have been so considered 
as such by the majority. As the dissent rightfully argues, “the 
presence of indigenous wildlife generally is as much a part of the 
natural condition of land as are the rivers, lakes, or trees cited by 
the majority”.108 
                                                
103 Id. 
104 See Blackner, 2002 UT 44, ¶¶ 15-16. 
105 See Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶ 58 (Parrish, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
106 Id. 
107 See generally Blackner, 2002 UT 44, ¶¶ 15-16. 
108 Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶ 53 (Parrish, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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VII. WILDLIFE AS A “NATURAL CONDITION”—
SUPPORT FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS WHERE 
WILDLIFE HAS BEEN APPROPRIATELY INTERPRETED 
AS A CONDITION ON THE LAND 
Aside from the baffling holding of the majority in basing its 
reasoning on paradoxical interpretation of both the Immunity Act 
and Utah case law, had the majority comprehensively looked to 
other states for elucidation on whether wildlife should be 
considered a “natural condition”, it would have found that there is 
support for the interpretation of wildlife as a condition on the 
land.109 In fact, in many jurisdictions throughout the United States, 
indigenous wildlife has been considered a naturally occurring 
condition on the land, as construed broadly under particular 
immunity or recreational statutes, and that the distinction is not 
solely placed upon topographical structures in nature.110 
Because the support from other jurisdictions involve injuries 
caused by wildlife, it is first important to recognize how wildlife is 
treated under tort law and the American legal system, in order to 
better understand the reasoning behind other jurisdictional 
decisions. In the American legal system, wild animals are often 
called ferae naturae. Wild animals are defined as animals that are 
not considered statutorily domesticated or controlled but rather are 
“naturally untamable, unpredictable, dangerous, or mischievous.”111 
“Wild creatures, such as game, are part of the land and pass with it, 
though it cannot be said that they are within the ownership of any 
particular person.”112 Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a 
wild animal is one that “is not by custom devoted to the service of 
mankind at the time and in the place in which it is kept.”113 
                                                
109 See generally Arroyo v. State of California, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 627 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1995); Estate of Hilston ex rel. Hilston v. State, 160 P.3d 507 (Mont. 2007); 
and Belhumeur v. Zilm, 949 A.2d 162 (N.H. 2008). 
110 Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶ 59 (Parrish, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
111 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (West). 
112 Id. citing G.C. Cheshire, Modern Law of Real Property 118 (3d ed. 1933). 
113 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 506 (1977). 
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The Restatement of Torts advises that a landowner is not 
generally liable for harm caused by wildlife on his or her property 
unless the landowner exerts some containment or control of the 
wild animal, or the animal was introduced to the area by the 
landowner as a non-indigenous species.114 Generally, wild animals 
are considered a “condition on the land” or a “natural condition” 
under recreational use statutes (similar to immunity statutes—which 
preclude liability).115 
In stating the above, the following cases from neighboring 
jurisdictions, should be considered in stark contrast to the Utah 
Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation of the Utah Immunity Act, 
and the holding that wildlife is not a “natural condition” in 
Francis.116 
A. Montana: 
One of the closest cases on point to Francis is a Montana 
Supreme Court case, Estate of Hilston ex rel. Hilston v. State, 
where a hunter was the victim of a fatal grizzly bear attack.117 The 
representative of the hunter’s estate sued the state for negligence 
and sought damages for the attack that happened on state owned 
land while the hunter was hunting elk.118 
Unlike the Utah Supreme Court, the Montana Supreme 
Court held that grizzly bears were “conditions of the property” 
under Montana’s State Recreational Use Immunity Act, barring 
Hilston’s representatives from recovering of damages against the 
State.119 
The Montana Supreme Court went through an analysis of 
the important distinction of how the law has treated the 
                                                
114 4 MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND LITIGATION § 37:2 (2d ed.). 
115 Id. at § 39:36. 
116 See generally Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶ 59 (Parrish, J., dissenting) (where the 
dissent readily points to much of the following case law support to contrast the 
majority’s decision with other jurisdictions). 
117 See Hilston, 160 P.3d 507. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at ¶ 17. 
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classification and legal applications when dealing with wild 
indigenous animals.120 The typical rule cited by the court was that 
the owner of land is not liable for wild animals that are indigenous 
to the land, unless the owner of the land has controlled possession 
or the animal, or the animal is a non-native, that the owner 
introduced to the area.121 
The Montana Supreme Court determined that, because 
grizzly bears are indigenous wild animals that exist upon the 
property in the area of the attack, the bear fit under the “condition 
of the property” for the Montana Recreational Use Immunity Act.122 
B. California: 
The opinion in Hilston cited a similar case, Arroyo v. State 
of California, from the California Court of Appeals, which 
supported the holding of wildlife being a condition of the land.123 
Arroyo was a case about a young boy who was hiking a trail in a 
state park with his family when he was mauled by a mountain 
lion.124 The boy’s family sued the State for infliction of emotional 
distress and negligence.125 
Similar to the legal considerations in Francis and Hilston, 
Arroyo dealt with the issue of state immunity under the California’s 
immunity statute, called the California Tort Claims Act.126 The Act 
“. . .provides an absolute immunity from liability for injuries 
                                                
120 Id. at ¶¶15-17 (the court recognized the general legal distinction between 
domitae naturae (domestic animals) and ferae naturae (wildlife) in terms of the 
application of landowner duties and liabilities towards third parties under the law. 
Generally under the law, a landowner assumes liability towards third parties 
regarding injuries resulting from domestic animals. Contrastingly, generally 
under the law, a landowner assumes no liability regarding injuries resulting from 
wildlife). 
121 Id. at ¶ 15, citing Nicholson v. Smith, 986 S.W.2d 54, 60 (Tex. App. 1999). 
122 Id. at ¶ 15. 
123 Hilston, 160 P.3d 507 at ¶ 16, see Arroyo, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 627, 627. 
124 Arroyo, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 627 at 627. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
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resulting from a natural condition of any unimproved public 
property.”127 
Also similar to the plaintiffs in Francis, the plaintiffs in 
Arroyo asserted that a wild animal is not a “natural condition” of 
the state park, and that only physical conditions to the land are 
applicable under the statute.128 However, the court disagreed and 
narrowly determined that within the statute (and interpreting the 
intent of the legislature) wild animals are a natural condition of 
unimproved public property, and fit within the meaning of the 
statute because they are wild and the state did not have custody of 
the animals.129 
The court in Arroyo determined for policy reasons that the 
State wanted to encourage the public use of hiking trails in public 
regions, and that such immunity statutes help to relieve the State 
from taking on the large burden of public safety, and of defending 
against legal suits.130 The Court stated that the statute “. . .requires 
the public to assume the risk of using hiking trails in state parks”.131 
C. New Hampshire: 
Even in cases with privately owned land, courts have readily 
interpreted that wildlife is a “natural condition”. For example, the 
Supreme Court of New Hampshire in Belhumeur v. Zilm, held that 
wild bees, that attacked an individual, were a condition of purely 
natural origin as condition on the land.132 Because of this, the court 
determined under common law that the landowner, on whose land 
the injury occurred, was immune from liability for injuries to 
                                                
127 CAL. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 831.2 (West). 
128 Arroyo, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 627 at 630-31. 
129 Id., (the court cited the California Supreme Court’s reasoning in Ex parte 
Maier, 37 P. 402, 404 (Cal. 1894), where it stated “[t]he wild game within a state 
belongs to the people in their collective, sovereign capacity; it is not the subject 
of private ownership, except in so far as the people may elect to make it so . . . 
.”). 
130 Id. at 631. 
131 Id. 
132 Belhumeur v. Zilm, 949 A.2d 162 (N.H. 2008). 
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another resulting from the wild bees.133 The court reasoned that the 
wild bees that attacked and injured an individual on the land were a 
“condition of purely natural origin”. 134 Because the bees were wild 
animals, indigenous to the property, and no evidence indicated that 
the landowner contributed to the existence of the bees or nest, the 
landowner was immune from liability under common law.135 
The above cases illustrate that dangerous indigenous 
wildlife have consistently been defined as a “natural condition” or 
condition on the land, fitting neatly under immunity or recreational 
act exceptions, as well as under common law. Aside from the above 
cases, throughout numerous other jurisdictions in the United States, 
migratory wildlife has been held to fit within the exceptions of 
various immunity statutes.136 
The Utah Supreme Court should have comprehensively 
studied these examples, and gleaned that other jurisdictions support 
the notion that indigenous wildlife is not solely confined to 
topographical features, and therefore a black bear could, and should 
have been considered a “natural condition” under the Immunity 
Act.137 Like many of these other jurisdictions, the Utah Supreme 
Court should have construed the “natural condition” exception more 
broadly, as to include wildlife within the Immunity Act. 
                                                
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 163-64. 
135 Id. 
136 See generally Nicholson v. Smith, 986 S.W.2d 54, 60 (Tex. App. 1999) 
(where the court held that a recreational vehicle park (RV park) was not liable for 
injuries to camping guests caused by fire ants); and Palumbo v. State Game & 
Fresh Water Fish Comm'n, 487 So.2d 352, 353 (Fla. App. 1986) (where the court 
held that a recreational park (RV park next to a state park) was not liable for 
injuries to a swimmer resulting from an alligator attack. The court held that the 
animal was in its natural habitat, natural in its own existence, and was indigenous 
to the area—factors that barred liability on part of the State). 
137 Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶ 59 (Parrish, J., dissenting). 
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VIII. WILDLIFE AS A “NATURAL CONDITION”—
LEGISLATIVE WORKS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR 
LAWMAKERS 
As the result in Francis dramatically displayed, regarding 
municipal liability, lawmakers should decide whether wildlife 
should be included within immunity and recreational use statutes. 
Lawmakers facing the drafting and amending of immunity or 
recreational acts, with an applicable “natural condition” (intended 
to include indigenous wildlife), should look to other jurisdictions 
where courts have construed such acts to include wildlife. 
Lawmakers must further look to the specific language and 
text of statutes that specifically state the inclusion of wildlife, to aid 
as templates for drafting or amending the acts. This should be done 
to give full effect of the statutes, by utilizing examples where courts 
have found evidence of legislative intent in interpreting the laws 
under the facts of particular cases, either under broad construction 
or expressly. By using such examples in drafting or amending 
immunity statutes, lawmakers can lay out a clear map to courts by 
displaying clear intent to include indigenous wildlife under “natural 
condition” exceptions—and hopefully protect the State from 
outcomes like Francis. 
Specifically, Utah lawmakers should redraft the current 
Immunity Act—as to include indigenous wildlife within the 
meaning of the “natural condition” exception; in order to preclude 
particular municipal liability; and to avoid outcomes like Francis. 
Listed below are several examples of immunity or recreation use 
statutes, and court decisions regarding the interpretation of the acts. 
These examples should benefit Utah (and like jurisdictions) as 
suggestions in drafting or amending immunity statutes. 
(1) Montana: The Montana Recreational Immunity Act 
lacks specific legislative language that asserts explicitly that 
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wildlife is considered a “condition of the property”.138 Instead, the 
Montana Supreme Court has broadly construed the statute to 
include wildlife as such a condition of the property.139 For instance, 
in the Hilston case, the Supreme Court of Montana interpreted the 
Recreational Immunity Act broadly to allow a grizzly bear to fit 
under the exception of a “condition of the property”.140 The purpose 
of the Recreational Immunity Act is to “grant a landowner relief 
from liability to persons gratuitously entering land for recreation 
purposes.”141 The Montana Recreational Immunity Act specifically 
states: 
A person who uses property, including property owned or 
leased by a public entity, for recreational purposes, with or without 
permission, does so without any assurance from the landowner that 
the property is safe for any purpose if the person does not give a 
valuable consideration to the landowner in exchange for the 
recreational use of the property. The landowner owes the person no 
duty of care with respect to the condition of the property, except 
that the landowner is liable to the person for any injury to person or 
property for an act or omission that constitutes willful or wanton 
misconduct.142 
(2) California: The purpose of the California Tort Claims 
Act is to limit liability of particular public entities in order to ensure 
that the public has access to certain recreational areas.143 The 
limitation of liability is intended to result in cost savings to the 
public, by eliminating the need for funds to cover ‘potential’ 
litigation defense costs that would occur otherwise, from injury 
related suits on governmental lands.144 The Act specifically 
                                                
138 MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-16-302 (West); cf. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-7-301 
(5)(k) (West) (which also has a similar provision for “natural condition” but does 
not define expressly what constitutes a “natural condition” on the land). 
139 Hilston, 160 P.3d at ¶¶ 14-15. 
140 Id. 
141 Simchuk v. Angel Island Comty. Ass'n, 833 P.2d 158, 161 (Mont. 1992), 
overruled by Saari v. Winter Sports, Inc., 64 P.3d 1038 (Mont. 2003). 
142 MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-16-302(1) (West) (emphasis added). 
143 Arroyo, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 630. 
144 Id. 
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includes a non-exclusive list of topographical features, but does not 
limit the list as inclusive of only topographical features as natural 
conditions.145 The California Tort Claims Act provides: 
Neither a public entity nor a public employee is 
liable for an injury caused by a natural condition of 
any unimproved public property, including but not 
limited to any natural condition of any lake, stream, 
bay, river or beach.146 
Although wildlife is not specifically mentioned in the 
statute, the court in Arroyo broadly interpreted the statute to include 
a mountain lion as indigenous wildlife that would constitute a 
“natural condition” under the immunity provision.147 In California, 
courts have construed the “natural condition” exception to include: 
a lake boating accident; an injury from a man-made sandbar on a 
beach; the collapse of a cliff in an unimproved area of a state park; 
death from falling rocks; and the death of an individual caused by 
mauling by a mountain lion in a state park.148 
(3) Texas: In Texas, although wild animals are not 
explicitly mentioned by the Texas Tort Claims Act, the Editor’s 
Notes section states that under the recreational use statute, “natural 
conditions” include “. . .a sheer cliff, a rushing river, or even a 
concealed rattlesnake”.149 This clearly suggests that in Texas the 
statute does not exclusively include topographical structures, but 
also includes wild animals as a “natural condition”. 
(4) Wisconsin: Wisconsin’s Recreational Use Statute 
explicitly states that wild animals fall within the liability exceptions 
of the State (with limited exceptions). Stating that a landowner, or 
governmental agent is not “. . .liable for the death of, any injury to, 
or any death or injury caused by, a person engaging in a 
recreational activity on the owner’s property or for any death or 
                                                
145 CAL. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 831.2 (West) (2012). 
146 Id. (emphasis added). 
147 Arroyo, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 630. 
148 2 Cal. Affirmative Def. § 38:108 (2013 ed.). 
149 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 75.002 (West) (emphasis added). 
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injury resulting from an attack by a wild animal”.150 This language 
makes it clear that wild animals are included within the liability 
exception for the state, and is helpful for potential interpretation 
issues, because of the transparency of including wild animals within 
the statute. 
Although the majority in Francis stated that if the 
legislature intended wildlife to be considered within the Immunity 
Act, it would have stated so in the Act, statutes and decisions from 
other jurisdictions; as illustrated above, indicate otherwise.151 In 
fact, it seems the opposite is true, that courts in these jurisdictions 
interpret applicable Immunity Acts more broadly to encompass 
wildlife as an applicable condition on the land, or a “natural 
condition”. The Utah Supreme Court should have likewise 
interpreted Utah’s Immunity Act broadly to allow for the black bear 
to be considered as part of the “natural condition” exception, which 
would have precluded liability for the State. 
Because Francis displayed that the Utah Supreme Court 
requires more definite language to consider wildlife a “natural 
condition”,152 lawmakers should change the Immunity Act to 
expressly include indigenous wildlife. Currently, the Utah 
Immunity Act and natural condition exception reads: 
Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is 
not waived [. . .] if the injury arises out of, in 
connection with, or results from [. . .] (k) any natural 
condition on publicly owned or controlled lands.153 
It is proposed that Utah lawmakers make the following 
necessary changes to the current Immunity Act, as to explicitly 
include indigenous wildlife within the definition of the natural 
condition exception: 
Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is 
not waived [. . .] if the injury arises out of, in 
                                                
150 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.52(2)(b) (West), (emphasis added). 
151 See Hilston, 160 P.3d at ¶¶ 14-15; Arroyo, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 630; Tex. Civ. 
Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 75.002 (West). 
152 Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶¶ 45-47. 
153 UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-7-301(5)(k) (West). 
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connection with, or results from [. . .] (k) any natural 
condition on publicly owned or controlled lands—
[where natural condition refers to both naturally 
occurring topographical structures on the land (such 
as rivers, lakes, and mountains), as well as 
indigenous wildlife on the land]. 
This simple change to the text of the statute would satisfy 
the ‘want’ of the majority in Francis for the legislature to expressly 
include the intended language on wildlife in the statute.154 Utah and 
similar jurisdictions should take note from the express legislative 
language used in jurisdictions Texas and Wisconsin, where 
immunity statutes expressly state that wild animals fall within the 
“natural condition” exception, or fall under the immunity exception 
in general.155 
IX. WILDLIFE EXCLUDED AS A “NATURAL 
CONDITION”—PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
UNDER FRANCIS 
It could be argued that, as a matter of public policy, the Utah 
Supreme Court came to the correct decision in Francis. One such 
concern is that the court is not extending the “natural condition” 
exception past what the legislature had stated within the statute.156 
Interpretation of the statute under a conservative or traditional 
‘textualist’ reading might agree that the Utah Supreme Court 
interpreted the statute correctly by following the letter of the law 
within the bounds of the text of the statute.157 Textualists would 
                                                
154 Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶¶ 45-47. 
155 See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 75.002 (West 2007); Wis. Stat. 
Ann. § 895.52(2)(b) (West 2013). 
156 See Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶¶ 45-47. 
157 ‘Textualist’, derived from ‘textualism’ is a traditionally based theory of 
statutory interpretation, where the text within the statute is solely the evidentiary 
basis of the statue's original meaning, and governs how the statute should be 
interpreted. This is contrasted with other methods of statutory interpretation 
schemes, such as looking into the intent of the legislature, and a historical 
meaning behind the passing of the statute, as aid in interpretation of the meaning 
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argue in line with the majority in Francis, that if the legislature 
intended wildlife to be considered a “natural condition” on the land, 
then they would have put the language in the statute.158 
Certainly, public policy may dictate that a narrow 
construction of the statute is required. However, as other 
jurisdictions with similar statutes have proven, immunity acts have 
been construed broadly, despite the lack of specific inclusion of 
wildlife within the text of the acts.159 Unlike the majority’s 
reasoning, it is inconceivable and irrational for the legislature to 
expressly list every single mechanism that constitutes a “natural 
condition” within the exception of the statute in order for the court 
to construe the statute appropriately.160 Reasonably, the very intent 
of the Immunity Act calls for broad application, to protect the State 
from liabilities arising from hazards on unimproved government 
property.161 The court itself had previously broadly construed the 
Act under prior case law to include topographical features, when 
the Act does not expressly provide for such application.162 
Therefore, the majority’s narrow ‘textualist’ interpretation that the 
black bear was not a “natural condition” under the Immunity Act’s 
exceptions was unsubstantiated, and it should have held otherwise. 
Further reflecting the majority’s opinion, is the idea of 
public satisfaction in holding the State of Utah responsible for 
heightened safety concerns in state parks and on state lands. Had 
the court come to an opposite conclusion, the results could have 
caused serious apprehensions about the idea of State immunity in 
general. The public could have possibly taken issue with the State, 
                                                
of the text; see generally Textualism, JUDGEPEDIA.ORG, http://judgepedia.org/ 
index.php/Textualism (last visited Nov 1, 2013). 
158 See Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶ 46, (where the majority states, “the legislature 
could easily have stated expressly that the State retains immunity for injuries 
arising from indigenous wildlife”). 
159 See generally Arroyo, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 627 (Cal. App. 2d Dist.1995); Hilston, 
160 P.3d 507 (Mont. 2007). 
160 See generally Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶ 60. 
161 See Grappendorf v. Pleasant Grove City, 2007 UT 84, ¶ 8 (Utah 2007). 
162 See Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶ 60. (Parrish, J., dissenting); see also UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 63G-7-301 (5)(k) (West 2008). 
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for having preclusion to liability in egregious situations on public 
lands involving wildlife. This could potentially result in public 
distrust in the legislature, as well as the current Immunity Act and 
State system. However, even if such public dissatisfaction and 
distrust were to result, then a public call to action for the legislature 
to change the law could occur. It can be argued that it often takes 
tragic or unfortunate occurrences to display areas of the law that 
call for reformation or change; such change is a necessary 
component in our political system and society as a democracy. 
There could have been negative public backlash through 
public condemnation, by not holding the state liable for the 
incident—especially when state agents had knowledge of the bear’s 
presence in the area.163 In the court of public opinion, the people 
would likely empathize with the side of apparent ‘justice’ for an 
innocent 11-year old, who met such tragic ends—even if such 
‘justice’ comes at the cost of the inappropriate statute interpretation. 
However, the public should be far more concerned if the judiciary 
chooses its decisions based on public satisfaction over the proper 
interpretation of the law. Such risky decision-making places the 
entire concept of the law and justice in a box of invalidity and 
arbitrariness. This result does not provide justice, and is certainly 
not exemplar for a law abiding society. 
Finally, those who side with the majority might also argue 
that were the State not liable in Francis, then it would result in 
decreased tourism because of public fear in visiting government run 
parks. These results could ultimately have an adverse effect on the 
economic system’s entire economy and of the State and Parks 
Systems. However, there are heavier negative implications 
regarding public policy and economic concerns under the decision 
in Francis.164 
As will be discussed, the Utah Supreme Court’s decision in 
Francis, carries far more potentially damaging public policy 
                                                
163 See Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶¶ 7-10 (where the court discusses that the DWR 
had knowledge that an aggressive black bear had frequented the campground 
earlier the day of Samuel Ives’s death). 
164 See infra text and accompanying notes in Section 0. 
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consequences for the public, than if it had held that wildlife is a 
“natural condition” on the land.165 Primarily, governmental liability 
costs taxpayers money in general, as funds are redistributed to 
cover potential litigation costs and settlements.166 Because of 
Francis, an entirely new classification of liability causing devices 
has now been recognized—which is wildlife.167 By adding wildlife 
as another group of devices that can create liability for the State, the 
ramifications from this heightened liability will adversely cost the 
taxpayers, local economies, the State Parks System, and will 
ultimately cause an unreasonable burden to the State.168  As will be 
discussed, the decision in Francis could detriment Utah’s 
indigenous wildlife populations, and such faunae have previously 
been and should continue to be protected and preserved.169 
Generally governmental liability imposes significant 
burdens and costs on taxpayers, and specifically burdens the portion 
of the public needing governmental assistance—who are likely to 
lose out on resources when fund allocation goes to paying litigation 
costs and judgments.170 For instance, the allocation of resources in 
regards to taxes and governmental funds are significantly reduced 
because of governmental tort liability, regarding the “optimal ratio 
of government benefit to taxes” by elected officials.171 When 
judgments and litigation expenses are rendered against the State, 
government officials are faced with the decision to reduce funds 
available for future allocation, raise taxes, or to incur and divert the 
debt to future budgets where it will be repaid at market-rate-interest 
(jurisdiction permitting).172 
                                                
165 Id. 
166 See infra text and accompanying notes 170-172. 
167 See generally Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶¶ 48-49 (where the court holds that the 
black bear is not a “natural condition” under the Immunity Act, therefore the 
State could not raise this defense to preclude its liability). 
168 See infra text and accompanying notes 174-184. 
169 See infra text and accompanying notes 190-193. 
170 Rosenthal, supra note 6 at 870. 
171 Rosenthal, supra note 6 at 832. 
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Currently, Francis is in remand, and because the State has 
been precluded from asserting immunity for liability under the 
Immunity Act, this could likely result in the State paying damages 
to the Mulveys; the calculations of which could be potentially 
significant. As was mentioned in the beginning of this article, the 
Samuel Ives’s family (the Mulveys) was awarded over 1.9 million 
dollars from the United States after winning its suit in federal 
court.173 It can be inferred that if state and federal parks and entities 
were held liable for every unfortunate act where indigenous wildlife 
injured a human, then such large awards reasonably could preclude 
public use and park economic viability. 
In fact, the Utah Park System and some parks are already 
facing financial difficulties and the possibilities of closure. Due to 
existing budget concerns and deficiencies, a 2011 Utah State Park 
Legislative Audit Report suggested that the State consider the 
privatization, or pilot the privatization of several State parks.174 In 
2011, only nine out of forty-three Utah parks made enough money 
to not require State funding.175 Therefore, lawmakers ordered the 
report to collaborate ideas on how to make Utah parks more 
efficient.176 The Audit Report proposed that in order to cut costs, 
certain parks should be completely closed, and that jobs and 
employee positions should be completely eliminated for many of 
the Utah parks.177 
Further, the Utah State Park’s General Fund has been 
significantly decreasing in recent years—from over $12-million 
dollars in 2008, to only $6.8 million in 2012.178 This decrease has 
                                                
173 See Francis v. U.S., No. 2:08CV244 DAK, 2011 WL 1667915, at *7-8 (D. 
Utah May 3, 2011). 
174 STATE OF UTAH OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR GENERAL, A 
PERFORMANCE AUDIT OF UTAH STATE PARKS 49, 57 (2011) [hereinafter AUDIT 
REPORT], available at http://le.utah.gov/audit/11_03rpt.pdf. 
175 Brock Vergakis, Audit: Some Utah State Parks May Need to Close, 
STANDARD EXAMINER, XPLORE OUTDOORS, (Jan. 18, 2011), http://www. 
xploreutah.net/story/audit-some-utah-state-parks-may-need-close. 
176 Id. 
177 AUDIT REPORT, supra note 174 at 31-57. 
178 FRIENDS OF UTAH STATE PARKS, FRIENDS OF UTAH STATE PARKS PARK 
REPORT, 8-9, http://friendsofutahstateparks.org/sites/default/  
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resulted in the reduction of many of the parks’ dates of operation 
and hours; fewer outreach programs; fewer law enforcement 
officers in the parks; the deferment of many maintenance issues and 
repairs; as well as the termination of twenty-two full-time 
employees.179 
Adding proverbial fuel to the already existing financial fire 
for State parks and local economy was the recent partial 
government shutdown in October 2013. Closure for the majority of 
the parks lasted approximately ten days, before any State 
intervention for any re-openings.180 Because of the partial 
shutdown, it was estimated that Utah’s tourism took a significant 
financial impact loss of 30 million dollars, with a majority of the hit 
coming from the closure of national and state parks and related 
businesses.181 
It is therefore reasonable to deduce that the already existing 
financial burdens will not improve with newly impending 
heightened liability on the State; government funds could be 
tightened generally, and specifically for the allocation of certain 
programs. If heightened liability adds to the dissolution of State 
Park funds, it is also reasonable to conclude that this will have a 
rippling adverse impact on the public—as State Parks make up an 
essential part of the Utah’s public economy and way of life.182 
Utah’s Department of Natural Resources has stated, “[t]he Utah 
state park system was created to provide recreation and educational 
opportunities for citizens of Utah and to stimulate local 
economies.”183 According to the Utah Department of Natural 
Recourses (DNR), state parks provide “tremendous economic 
                                                
files/ UtStPksBudgetPresentation2011-09.pdf (last visited Sept. 14, 2013). 
179 Id. 
180 Dennis Romboy, Government Shutdown Hit Utah Tourism for $30M, 
DESERET NEWS (Oct. 24, 2013, 3:17 PM), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/ 
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182 AUDIT REPORT, supra note 174, at 71. 
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benefits to [Utah’s] state and local communities through increased 
revenue and tourism”.184 
Additionally, it is completely irrational to place the burden 
of protecting the public from indigenous wildlife on the State. The 
dissent in Francis reasonably acknowledged the key importance of 
the natural condition exception for State immunity, opining that 
especially in naturally dense public lands, like Utah’s vast natural 
landscape, the government cannot be expected to protect every 
person against every condition that might be dangerous on public 
lands.185 Placing this heavy burden of liability on the State would 
result in serious restrictive measures and prohibitions on public use 
of respective lands.186 As the dissent stated in its conclusion, “[t]he 
natural condition exception thus requires that those who voluntarily 
use unimproved public land assume some of the related risks as part 
of the price paid for the benefits of its use.”187 Furthermore, wildlife 
are potentially unpredictable and dangerous, and for these reasons 
alone, it should be considered unreasonable for the public to expect 
the State to protect it from every incident of contact with wildlife on 
State lands.188 Injury is therefore a “foreseeable” risk that one takes, 
when adventuring in the “unimproved wilderness”, and the State 
should not be responsible for this risk.189 
Lastly, there also must be some protection in place for 
indigenous wildlife in their natural habitats, as Utah’s wildlife has 
                                                
184 UTAH DEP’T OF NATURAL RES., ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF STATE PARKS,       
http://stateparks.utah.gov/resources/about/economic-benefits-state-parks (last 
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significance to its natural ecology and people.190 The majority of 
Utah’s vast, wild, landscape is made up of governmental public 
lands; reasonably the natural habitat of many of Utah’s indigenous 
wildlife species populations is located within these boundaries.191 
This means that realistically, many times humans are stepping into 
the natural habitat of wildlife, not vice versa. Further, unfortunately 
natural-habitat-loss in Utah has already resulted in the reduction of 
many native wildlife populations throughout the state, calling for a 
comprehensive wildlife conservation strategy.192 These 
conservation strategies and relating funds were put in place under 
strong policy concerns to “effectively restore and enhance wildlife 
populations and their habitat[s], and prevent the need for additional 
listings on the Endangered Species List”.193 Such conservation 
efforts support the idea of the public concern for the “rehabilitation 
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of native species” as part of the “natural condition” of Utah 
lands.194 Utah has long-standing public policy concerns for 
protecting even seemingly dangerous wildlife in the State of Utah; 
the black bear and cougar populations have both been specifically 
protected species since 1967.195 
In certain instances, like in the Francis case, when such 
unfortunate attacks occur, the animals are often hunted down and 
terminated under State policy.196 Although there are reasonable 
policy concerns for the termination of proven deadly or dangerous 
animals for the protection of the public, there are policy concerns 
for protecting and preserving these wild animals in their own 
domain.197 Wildlife should remain protected, especially when in 
certain circumstances humans are theoretically merely visitors in 
the wild and wondrous natural world, and are reasonably on the 
‘turf’ of indigenous wildlife. 
X. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, The Utah Supreme Court in Francis, should 
have held that the black bear that killed Samuel Ives, as indigenous 
wildlife, constituted a “natural condition” under proper 
interpretation of both Utah’s Immunity Act, as well as Utah case 
law, and therefore liability against the State of Utah should have 
been precluded in the case. A black bear is as much a part of the 
land, as the land itself as a part of nature; the majority even admits 
that it reasonably could be perceived as a “natural condition”.198 
Further, Utah case law has not precluded the determination that 
indigenous wildlife fall under the “natural condition” exception of 
the Immunity Act.199 
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Although there could have been potential concerns of public 
distrust and negative backlash for not holding the State of Utah 
liable under the Immunity Act in Francis, there are heavier negative 
policy concerns in the current decision that spread over public, 
municipal, safety, environmental, and economic concerns. As has 
been discussed, State Parks are already grappling with serious 
financial and budgetary issues, and adding liability suits against the 
State will reasonably only add to these budgetary issues.200 Such 
issues could reasonably be said to cause a chain reaction in the 
reduction and even possible closure of State Parks; the public could 
potentially lose access to beloved recreational activity, or such 
places could become privatized with increased costs for public use. 
The addition of heightened liability on the State, could reasonably 
further inflame the already troublesome budgetary concerns facing 
the Utah State Parks system.201 As a trickling-effect, this liability 
could also potentially hurt the employment and overall economies 
for the State of Utah, as well as the taxpayers. 
Further, although injuries and deaths caused by indigenous 
wildlife, on government owned land are tragic, existing Immunity 
Acts and statutes should be interpreted broadly to allow for 
indigenous wildlife to fall under the definition of a “natural 
condition” or “condition” on the land. If the courts refuse to broadly 
construe the “natural condition” exception, Utah, and similar 
lawmakers, should amend Immunity Acts to reflect that a “natural 
condition” to not only include topographical structures, but also 
indigenous wildlife. At the very least, lawmakers should include 
such information in the commentary to Immunity or Recreational 
Acts. These simple changes could rectify interpretative issues, and 
ensure that wildlife is expressly incorporated into intended 
immunity exceptions. Such changes would further relieve some of 
the major policy driven concerns that were previously discussed for 
the State of Utah, and other states facing similar issues. 
Lastly, there should be a balance struck between human 
enjoyment of State parks, along with the preservation of indigenous 
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wildlife and its natural habitats. And court interpretations like 
Francis could have a negative impact on these efforts. Because 
wildlife in Utah has been excluded as a “natural condition” on the 
land, the State now faces potentially serious liability implications 
concerning the protection of the public from indigenous wildlife on 
government owned lands.202 The public should be able to use public 
property in its “natural condition” for enjoyment and recreational 
purposes, but the burden of litigation and safety costs could 
detrimentally affect public use of such properties, and wildlife 
populations.203 
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